Russia’s gas weapon in Central and Eastern Europe
Diverging responses from three friendly states
Abstract
Russia deployed its ‘gas weapon’ to coerce European states into supporting its political agenda following its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This chapter explores the Kremlin’s intentions and the responses of Central and East European countries with relatively pro-Russian politics prior to the war. Russia aimed to minimise the target country’s contribution to Ukraine’s war efforts and support of Western sanctions, while nudging them to maintain cooperation. The form and impact of Russia’s actions differed based on the socio-political contexts, which are illustrated with three case studies: Hungary, Bulgaria, and Serbia. Findings are theorised with the use of analytical framework developed by Crawford and Klotz in 1999 that identifies four models of influence – ‘compellance’, ‘normative communication’, ‘resource denial’, and ‘political fracture’. The cases are not clear-cut but, broadly speaking, each falls into one of three categories – Hungary into the normative communication, Serbia into the resource denial, and Bulgaria into political fracture – based on predominant patterns, while compellance can be perceived in each country. Domestic and international policy, energy politics, and the characteristics of energy systems in the target countries all shape sanction design in addition to which the dominant political leadership’s penetration of domestic society is especially pertinent in shaping the sanction design, its effect, and the responses of the receiver of the sanctions.