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Megjelent a Munkaerőpiaci Tükör 2023-2024 Tovább olvasom

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A HUN-REN Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont Világgazdasági Intézete elnyerte az MTA Kiváló Kutatóhely minősítést Tovább olvasom

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Wellbeing and environmental performance of the Visegrad countries at the beginning of the 21st century - Lakócai Csaba tanulmánya Tovább olvasom

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Térképen mutatjuk, hol élnek a legtöbbet keresők Magyarországon - Bareith Tibor és Csizmadia Adrián írása a KRTK blogban a Portfolion Tovább olvasom

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Reducing Food Loss: Post-harvest Strategies at the Small Scale - Benedek Zsófia és szerzőtársai cikke megjelent a Eurochoices szakfolyóiratban Tovább olvasom

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KTI szeminárium: Balázs Ákos Miklós – Comparing mechanisms for course allocation with contracts

Az előadásra hibrid formában kerül sor zoom felületen, illetve személyesen a K.0.11-12-es földszinti előadóban  2024.12.05-én, 13.00 órától.

Előadó: Balázs Ákos Miklós

Cím: Comparing mechanisms for course allocation with contracts

Absztrakt: We study a course allocation problem with contracts which is unique in several aspects. Courses have lexicographic preferences that favour students from higher priority groups, and within these groups, those students who wish to take the course with higher-priority contract terms. Courses are also characterised by finite capacities. Students have preferences over sets of course-term pairs, which are their private information. However, they can send a signal that contains a ranking over singletons and a capacity for each contract term. It is also restricted that the same course cannot be listed with more than one contract term. We consider six different mechanisms for this course allocation problem: the HBS draft, its slight modification (referred to as SZISZ), the random serial dictatorship (RSD), the deferred acceptance with single (DASTB) and multiple tie break (DAMTB), and the latter followed by the stable improvement cycles algorithm (DAMTB+SIC). Our aim is to compare the performance of these mechanisms from several perspectives. First, we evaluate them by checking whether they satisfy certain desiderata (strategy-proofness, possible and necessary player- and student-efficiency, and pairwise stability). We also show that no mechanism can satisfy both strategy-proofness and pairwise stability, and the same is true for possible student-efficiency and pairwise stability. Next, we use a dataset containing the signalled preferences of students (as well as cardinal utilities) from 2023. We apply each mechanism to these signals several times and calculate some welfare indicators from the resulting matchings. Our findings indicate that although the RSD and DASTB mechanisms satisfy more theoretical desiderata, they are outperformed in most welfare indicators by the SZISZ and even more so by the HBS draft mechanism.