hu / en

Keller Tamás tanulmánya megjelent az Education Economics szakfolyóiratban Tovább olvasom

Tovább olvasom

Nagy Erika és szerzőtársai tanulmánya megjelent a European Planning Studies folyóiratban Tovább olvasom

Tovább olvasom

Szunomár Ágnes, Peragovics Tamás és Weiner Csaba cikke megjelent a Politics in Central Europe folyóiratban Tovább olvasom

Tovább olvasom

Megjelent Vasárus Gábor László, Farkas Jenő Zsolt, Hoyk Edit és Kovács András Donát cikke Tovább olvasom

Journal of Urban Management Tovább olvasom

Megjelent Szalavetz Andrea és Agnieszka Skala open access cikke a Geoforum szakfolyóiratban Tovább olvasom

Tovább olvasom

Megtéveszthetik a magyarokat a rendszeresen használt online platformok - Somogyi Róbert cikke a KRTK blogon Tovább olvasom

Tovább olvasom

KTI Szeminárium: David Medina Rodriguez (University of Malaga, University of Padova) – Life pension and Parliamentarian Effort

 

KTI Szeminárium: David Medina Rodriguez (University of Malaga, University of Padova) – Life pension and Parliamentarian Effort

Abstract:

Many democracies grant their parliamentarians access to an exclusive pension system. While there has been much debate about the financial cost of such schemes, little attention has been paid to their effect on parliamentary effort. We propose a model that captures the two main features of life pension schemes: i) the pension amount is increasing with seniority, and ii) age determines parliamentarians’ eligibility. Our model highlights heterogeneous incentives to exert parliamentarian effort: introducing a life pension decreases the effort of eligible parliamentarians with high accumulation levels and increases or maintains the effort of all other parliamentarians. We test this model using the introduction of the life pension in Italy in 1955 where the eligibility of parliamentarians depends on their age and the amount accumulated depends on their seniority. Our empirical results show that the prospects of accumulating a higher pension stimulates parliamentarians to exert more effort, especially when parliamentarians are not eligible. In contrast, eligible parliamentarians face a trade-off between accumulating further benefits or enjoying the life pension straight away. Senior eligible parliamentarians decrease their effort while all other parliamentarians maintain or increase their effort.

Online lehet részt venni az eseményen.

2024

Júl

25

H

K

Sz

Cs

P

Sz

V

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

1

2

3

4

Következő hónap >
2023.01.12.