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Előadó: Toygar Kerman
Cím: Pitfalls of Information Spillovers in Persuasion
Absztrakt:
We study a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model in which the sender wants to achieve an outcome and commits to an experiment which sends correlated messages to homogeneous receivers. Receivers are connected in a network and can perfectly observe their immediate neighbors’ messages. After updating their beliefs, receivers choose an action to match the true state of the world. Surprisingly, the sender’s gain from persuasion does not change monotonically with network density. We characterize a class of networks in which increased communication among the receivers is strictly better for the sender and hence strictly worse for the receivers.
